Optimal ratio between phase basis and bit basis in QKD by Hayashi, Masahito
ar
X
iv
:0
80
5.
31
90
v2
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  4
 Ju
n 2
00
8
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In the original BB84 protocol, the bit basis and the phase basis are used with equal probability.
Lo et al (J. of Cryptology, 18, 133-165 (2005)) proposed to modify the ratio between the two bases
by increasing the final key generation rate. However, the optimum ratio has not been derived.
In this letter, in order to examine this problem, the ratio between the two bases is optimized for
exponential constraints given Eve’s information distinguishability and the final error probability.
Bennett & Brasserd [1] proposed the BB84 protocol for
quantum key distribution. It was shown that this pro-
tocol generates secret random bits between two distinct
parties even though the quantum channel has noise[2, 3].
Once a security proof was obtained for this protocol,
many researchers [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] im-
proved the key generation rate. Lo et al [14] proposed to
improve the key generation rate by modifying the ratio
between the bit(+) basis and the phase(×) basis. In the
original BB84 protocol, the sender Alice and the receiver
Bob choose the + basis and the × basis with equal proba-
bility. However, this equal ratio is not essential, because
the purpose of a random basis choice is estimating the
phase error rate in the channel of the qubits in the co-
incidence basis. That is, in order to generate the secure
keys from the raw keys with the + basis, it is sufficient
to estimate the + error rate precisely. The aim of the
present letter is to improve the key generation rate by
modifying the ratio between two bases.
For example, the following protocol improves the key
generation rate. When Alice and Bob communicate N
qubits, Alice and Bob use the × basis only in the ran-
domly chosen
√
N qubits and use the + basis in the re-
maining N −
√
N qubits. In the above protocol, when
the length of the code N is sufficiently large, Alice and
Bob can estimate the phase error rate precisely. Since√
N/N approaches zero, the rate of discarded qubits ap-
proaches zero. That is, it is possible that the generation
rate of the raw keys with transmitted qubits is almost
100%. Hence, in order to optimize this ratio, we have
to choose a suitable formulation. Due to the difficulty of
the formulation, this optimization has not been treated in
existing researches. As a possible formulation, one may
consider the optimization of the final key generation rate
with a constant constraint for Eve’s information in the fi-
nite length code. However, as is discussed by Lo et al[14],
Hayashi [15], and Scarani and Renner [16], the formula of
finite length code is not simple. Furthermore, its analysis
depends on the length of the code.
This letter focuses on the exponential constraint as an
intermediate criterion between the finite-length case and
the infinite-length case. Exponential rate is a common
measure in information theory[17], and it was discussed
in QKD by several papers [15, 18, 19]. That is, we treat
exponential constraints for the block error probability for
final keys and for Eve’s information distinguishability for
final keys[20]. This letter optimizes the final key genera-
tion rate based on the key distillation protocol given by
Hayashi [15, 21]. In this key distillation protocol, first,
a classical error correction is performed. Next, privacy
amplification using the Toeplitz matrix, which is an eco-
nomical random matrix[22, 23], is performed. Hence,
Eve’s information distinguishability can be characterized
by the phase error probability of the corresponding CSS
code.
For a simpler analysis, a single photon source and the
lossless quantum channel are assumed to be available.
Furthermore, as an ideal assumption, the random coding
and the maximum likelihood decoding are assumed to be
performed in the classical error correction part.
[Result]
This letter focuses on the asymmetric protocol, in
which, Alice and Bob use the × basis with ratio p2, and
they announce the check bits, which are randomly cho-
sen with ratio p1 among the bits whose Alice’s basis and
Bob’s basis are the + basis. (As shown later, the optimal
case is given when the ratio of × basis by Alice is equal
to that used by Bob.) The performance of the protocol is
characterized by the final error probability of the classical
error correction and Eve’s information distinguishability.
The latter is equal to ‖ρAE − ρA ⊗ ρE‖1 for Eve’s final
state ρE , Alice’s final state ρA, and the final state ρAE
of the joint system of the final keys.
Both quantities depend on the number N of transmit-
ted qubits, the observed error rates q+ of + basis, and
the observed error rates q× of × basis. However, both
quantities cannot be determined by the above values be-
cause these depend on Eve’s attack. Hence, it is possi-
ble to compute only both upper bounds, i.e., the upper
bound Bb(N, p1, p2, q+) of the final error probability and
the upper bound Bp(N, p1, p2, q×) of Eve’s information
distinguishability[15, 21], which do not depend on Eve’s
attack. For a given constant C, the following exponential
constraint is considered:
lim
N→∞
−1
N
logBb(N, p1, p2, q+) ≥ C (1)
lim
N→∞
−1
N
logBp(N, p1, p2, q×) ≥ C. (2)
Then, the main target is the calculation of the rates
2p1 and p2 optimizing the final key generation rate
RA(p1, p2, q+, q×, C) under the conditions (1) and (2),
when q := q+ = q×.
In this letter, these values are numerically calculated
using the logarithm base 2 with C = 0.0001. For exam-
ple, when N = 100, 000, 2−CN = 2−10. However, since
the quantity Bp(N, p1, p2, q×) has some polynomial fac-
tor, it is greater than 2−10.
Next, we consider the symmetric protocol, in which
× basis is chosen with the same ratio with the + ba-
sis in both sides. In this case, it is possible to control
only the ratio p1 of the check bits. The original BB84
protocol is given in this case as p1 = 1/2. Then, we
numerically calculate the rate p1 optimizing the final
key generation rate RS(p1, q+, q×, C) under the condi-
tions (1) and (2), when q := q+ = q×. The numeri-
cal results of max0≤p1,p2≤1/2RA(p1, p2, q, q, 0.0001) and
max0≤p1≤1/2RS(p1, q, q, 0.0001) are shown in Figure 1.
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FIG. 1: Asymptotic key generation rate: The upper line
shows maxRA, while the lower line shows maxRS .
Using the above results, we obtain Fig. 2, which shows
argmax0≤p1≤1/2max0≤p2≤1/2RA(p1, p2, q, q, 0.0001) and
argmax0≤p1≤1/2RS(p1, q, q, 0.0001).
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FIG. 2: Optimal choice rate for the check bits: The upper
line is argmaxRS, while the lower line is argmaxRA.
Fig. 3 shows argmax0≤p2≤1/2max0≤p1≤1/2RA(p1, p2, q, q, 0.0001).
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FIG. 3: Optimal choice rate of × basis
[Derivation]
The above figures are derived by combining the type
method [25] and the analysis in Hayashi[15] as follows.
In this letter, we discuss the security based on the key
distillation protocol given in Hayashi[15], in which, af-
ter the generation of raw keys, the classical error correc-
tion is performed using a pseudo-classical noisy channel,
and random privacy amplification is applied using the
Toeplitz matrix. Similar to Hayashi [15], the following
derivation focuses on the discrete (partial)-twirled chan-
nel, by considering the phase error rate and the bit error
rate of this channel corresponding to the raw keys.
Let us calculate the probability that the esti-
mated phase error rate is q×, and the phase er-
ror rate among raw keys is q′×. As discussed
in Hayashi[15], this probability can be evaluated
using the hypergeometric distribution, that is,
(
( Np22
Np22q×
)(N(1−p2)2(1−p1)
N(1−p2)2(1−p1)
)
q′×)/
( N(p22+(1−p2)2(1−p1))
Np22q×+N(1−p2)
2(1−p1)q′×
)
,
where N is the total number of transmit-
ted qubits. Since 1n+12
nh(k/n) ≤ (nk
) ≤
2nh(k/n), this probability is bounded by
(
( Np22
Np22q×
)(N(1−p2)2(1−p1)
N(1−p2)2(1−p1)
)
q′×)/
( N(p22+(1−p2)2(1−p1))
Np22q×+N(1−p2)
2(1−p1)q′×
) ≤
ǫp(q
′
×) :=
2
−NDp(p1,p2,q×,q
′
×
)
N(p22+(1−p2)
2(1−p1))+1
, where the exponential
decreasing rate is given by
Dp(p1, p2, q×, q
′
×)
:=(p22 + (1− p2)2(1− p1))h(
p22q× + (1− p2)2(1 − p1)q′×
p22 + (1− p2)2(1 − p1)
)
− p22h(q×)− (1− p2)2(1− p1)h(q′×).
When the phase error rate among raw keys is q′×, the
random privacy amplification with the sacrificed bit rate
S2 reduces the block error probability of final keys in
the × basis to δp(q′×) := 2−N [S2−(1−p2)
2(1−p1)h(q
′
×
)]+ [15],
where [x]+ is x for a positive number x while [x]+ is
3zero for a negative number x. Since q′× takes the val-
ues in {0, 1/N, 2/N, . . . , 1}, the (block) error probability
of the final keys in the × basis is upperly bounded by
Bp(N, p1, p2, q×) :=
∑N
k=0 ǫp(
k
N )δp(
k
N ). Hence, applying
the type method to the parameter q′×[25], we obtain its
exponential decreasing rate (See Hayashi[15]):
lim
N→∞
−1
N
logBp(N, p1, p2, q×)
= min
0≤q′
×
≤1/2
(
[S2 − (1− p2)2(1− p1)h(q′×)]+
+Dp(p1, p2, q×, q
′
×)
)
. (3)
In the following discussion, S2(p1, p2, q×, C) presents the
solution S2 of (3) = C. In fact, Eve’s Holevo information
χE and Eve’s distinguishability ‖ρA,E − ρA ⊗ ρE‖1 are
characterized by [15, 21]
EχE ≤ (− logBp(N, p1, p2, q×) +M) ·Bp(N, p1, p2, q×)
E‖ρA,E − ρA ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ Emax
X
‖ρE,X − ρE‖1
≤ Bp(N, p1, p2, q×),
where E denotes the average concerning random pri-
vacy amplification, M denotes the length of the final
keys, and ρE,X is Eve’s state when the final key is X .
Hence, Bp(N, p1, p2, q×) can be regarded as an upper
bound for Eve’s distinguishability. Thus, the quantity
S2(p1, p2, q×, C) is the minimum sacrificed bit rate in the
random privacy under the condition that the exponential
decreasing rate of the upper bound of Eve’s distinguisha-
bility is greater than C.
Now, it will be shown why the rate p2,A of × basis of
Alice is assumed to be equal to the rate p2,B of × basis of
Bob. If different rates are chosen, then the performance
is characterized by the coincidence probability in +basis
(1−p2,A)(1−p2,B) = 1+p2,Ap2,B−2(p2,A+p2,B) and the
coincidence probability in × basis p2,Ap2,B. Hence, it is
sufficient to maximize the the coincidence probability in
+basis (1−p2,A)(1−p2,B) = 1+p2,Ap2,B−2(p2,A+p2,B)
with the condition that the coincidence probability in
×basis p2,Ap2,B is equal to an arbitrary constant P . This
maximum value is given when p2,A = p2,B =
√
P . Thus,
it is suitable to consider only the case of p2,A = p2,B.
In order to express the rate of sacrificed bits
S2(p1, p2, q×, C) as a function of the constraint C, we
introduce two quantities, q′×,1 and q
′
×,2 as the solutions
of the following equations in the range [0, 1/2]:
Dp(p1, p2, q×, q
′
×,1) = C
p22q× + (1− p2)2(1 − p1)q′×,2
p22(1 − q×) + (1− p2)2(1 − p1)(1− q′×,2)
= (
q′×,2
1− q′×,2
)2.
Then, the rate of sacrificed bits S2(p1, p2, q×, C) is given
as follows.
S2(p1, p2, q×, C) = (1− p2)2(1− p1)h(q′×,1)
when q′×,1 ≤ q′×,2. Otherwise,
S2(p1, p2, q×, C) = Dp(p1, p2, q×, q
′
×,2) + C.
Next, we consider the (block) error probability of the
final keys in the case when Gallager random coding and
maximum likelihood decoding are applied[17]. When the
bit error rate of the raw keys is q′+ and the rate of
sacrificed bits in classical error correction is S1, the fi-
nal error probability is upperly bounded by ǫb(q
′
+) :=
2−N [S1−(1−p2)
2(1−p1)h(q
′
+)]+ . We calculate the probabil-
ity that the estimate of the bit error rate is q+ and the
phase error bit among raw keys is q′+. Similar to the
case of the bit error rate, by using the hypergeomet-
ric distribution, this probability is upperly bounded by
δb(q
′
+) :=
2
−NDb(p1,p2,q+,q
′
+)
N(1−p2)2+1
, where the exponential de-
creasing rate is given by
Db(p1, p2, q+, q
′
+)
:=(1− p2)2
(
h(p1q+ + (1− p1)q′+)− p1h(q+)
− (1− p1)h(q′+)
)
.
Thus, the (block) error probability of the final keys in
the + basis is upperly bounded by Bb(N, p1, p2, q+) :=∑N
k=0 ǫb(
k
N )δb(
k
N ). Applying the type method to the
parameter q′+[25], we obtain the exponential decreasing
rate:
lim
N→∞
−1
N
logBb(N, p1, p2, q+)
= min
0≤q′+≤1/2
Db(p1, p2, q+, q
′
+)
+ [S1 − (1− p2)2(1− p1)h(q′+)]+. (4)
In the following, S1(p1, p2, q+, C) presents the solution S1
of (4) = C. Thus, the quantity, S1(p1, p2, q+, C), is the
minimum sacrificed bit rate in the classical error correc-
tion under the condition that the exponential decreasing
rate of the upper bound of error probability of the final
keys is greater than C.
Similar to S2(p1, p2, q×, C), in order to express the the
rate of sacrificed bits S1(p1, p2, q×, C) as a function of the
constraint C, we introduce two quantities, q′+,1 and q
′
+,2
as the solutions of the following in the range [0, 1/2]:
Db(p1, p2, q+, q
′
+,1) = C
p1q+ + (1− p1)q′+,2
p1(1− q+) + (1− p1)(1 − q′+,2)
= (
q′+,2
1− q′+,2
)2.
Therefore, S1(p1, p2, q×, C) is given as a function of the
constraint C as follows. When q′+,1 ≤ q′+,2,
S1(p1, p2, q+, C) = (1 − p2)2(1− p1)h(q′+,1).
Otherwise,
S1(p1, p2, q+, C) = Db(p1, p2, q+, q
′
+,2) + C.
4Hence, the final key generation rate RA(p1, p2, q+, q×, C)
is given by
RA(p1, p2, q+, q×, C)
=(1− p2)2(1 − p1)− S1(p1, p2, q+, C)− S2(p1, p2, q×, C).
Next, we consider the final key generation rate
RS(p1, q+, q×, C) in the symmetric case. In this case,
the exponential decreasing rate of the final error prob-
ability is given by substituting 1/2 into p2 in the
formula S1(p1, p2, q+, C). The exponential decreasing
rate of Eve’s distinguishability is given by substitut-
ing 1/2 into p2 in the formula S1(p1, p2, q×, C). Thus,
RS(p1, q+, q×, C) is calculated by
RS(p1, q+, q×, C)
=
1− p1
4
− S1(p1, 1/2, q+, E)− S1(p1, 1/2, q×, C).
Therefore, applying numerical analysis to these formu-
lae, we obtain Figs. 1, 2, and 3.
[Discussion]
It has been shown that the asymmetric protocol im-
proves the symmetric protocol under an exponential con-
straint condition based on the analysis on Hayashi[15].
This result suggests the importance of the choice of the
ratio between the two bases when designing QKD system.
A similar result can be expected based on Lo et al [14]
and Scarani[16]. It is interesting to compare the obtained
result with those based on Lo et al [14] and Scarani and
Renner[16]. A similar result can be expected in the de-
coy method[26, 27, 28, 29]. Future work will investigate
the same problem in the finite-length framework using
the decoy method [30]. As well, it has been shown in
this letter that the exponential rate is a useful criterion
for the case of limited coding length. It is interesting to
apply this criterion to other topics in QKD.
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